Iraq: An Unjust War
Iraq: An Unjust War by Paul Pennell is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 United States License.
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After September 11, 2001, the United States experienced a paradigm shift in its foreign policy. Rather than focusing on conflict prevention as his predecessors had done, George W. Bush rode a wave of emotionalism and focused on preemptively defending the United States against nations or groups he and his advisors deemed to be a threat. While pursuing terrorists and states that harbor them, the Bush administration began to make a case for action against Iraq under the premise that Saddam Hussein was manufacturing and concealing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and was linked to the terrorist group al Qaeda.[1]
On September 12, 2002, Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly in an attempt to gain support for action against Iraq. Four days later, Iraq invited UN weapons inspectors back into its borders. The US responded by pressuring the UN to pass, with some sense of urgency, a resolution to compel the Iraqi government to full cooperation. In an attempt to coerce the international community, the United States prevented inspectors from returning to Iraq until the UN would pass a new resolution demanding complete cooperation from Iraq. Furthermore, the United States “threatened to act alone or with a small coalition if the Council could not come to agreement.”[2]
The United States presented its case against Iraq again on October 10, 2002, “but ran into unexpectedly determined French and Russian resistance.”2 Unfortunately for the Bush administration’s campaign against Iraq, the global community was extremely reluctant to buy into anti-Iraq propaganda. The tactics and language used by the United States in making a case for action against Iraq “returned the mood to an intense hostility toward US policy reminiscent of the UNSCOM endgame.”2 To help justify action against Iraq, the Bush administration cited concerns about the potential for terrorism and the fear of the use of WMD against either the United States or its allies the world over.3 In the 2002 National Security Strategy detail released by the National Security Council, headed by then President George W. Bush, the council detailed the idea of imminent threat and its implications on United States security policy:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. . .We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not attack us using conventional means.[3]
It was through this lens that the Bush administration justified military action against the otherwise sovereign nation of Iraq. In his address to the American people, Bush made a case for action against Iraq saying,
The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet that threat now, with our Army, Air force, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.[4]
Though Bush and his advisors had framed the Iraq conflict as an act of preemption, this address describes preventive war rather than preemptive war. At first glance, these seem to be largely the same concept, but each is viewed quite differently in international law and within the context of how the United Nations currently justifies war.
Within the context of international law, preemptive war is generally thought to be legal and permitted under the United Nations Charter, Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.[5]
In fact, the Bush administration used this Article as justification for military action against Iraq, claiming that inaction would inevitably result in violence against the United States.[6] Though preemptive war is permissible when a nation is threatened by another, the United Nations Charter also expressly prohibits the use of military force without prior approval from the UN Security Council:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.[7]
From this perspective, the conflict surrounding the use of American military force in Iraq becomes more apparent. Though the Bush administration claimed to be justified in invading Iraq to protect the United States and the world from Saddam Hussein and “weapons of mass murder,” the conditions established in the United Nations Charter outlining when war is acceptable were not met in Bush’s case for war against Iraq.
On the other hand, preventive war would not be protected by the United Nations as acceptable means by which a nation state may defend its own interest in light of aggression or the threat thereof from another nation state. This is the condition in which the United States framed the argument for action against Iraq. When Bush authorized a unilateral attack against Iraq and described its purpose as being to prevent the potential for future war and damages to the United States, he effectively shifted the argument away from preemption and to prevention, which significantly altered the role played by the United States.
In preemption, the United States may have been justified in attacking Iraq due to some form of imminent Iraqi aggression; however, by being the initial aggressor, the United States effectively violated International Law and made an illegal attack against Iraq based on the rules set forth in the United Nations Charter.7 In the past, nations engaging in preventive warfare are frequently viewed by the international community as aggressors and do not typically find support for their action against another nation. Though this event happened prior to the formation of the United Nations, it could reasonably be argued that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a move of prevention by Japan. In fact, the Japanese attempted to portray the attack as such by pointing to American policy that made it increasingly difficult for Japan to gain access to valuable natural resources for their development as an emerging industrialized nation.
In order to reconcile why the Bush administration might wage a war against Iraq without support from the United Nations Security Council and without support from the global community, many have speculated that there were ulterior motives behind the US invasion of Iraq. In his announcement of the initial attack on Iraq, Bush said,
We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.4
It has been argued by many that the motive for entering Iraq, among others, is the ability for the United States to enter the region and acquire additional oil or to otherwise stabilize oil supply to the United States. Other scholars have argued that the notion of oil as a motive for an invasion of Iraq is poorly founded. Daniel Yergin described the idea saying, “No US administration would launch so momentous a campaign just to facilitate a handful of oil development contracts and a moderate increase in supply—half a decade from now.”[8]
Though there are many claims about the motives for and the reasons behind the invasion of Iraq by the United States, it is difficult to accurately pinpoint a specific reason for the military strike. Knowing that there are many opinions as to the reasoning behind the invasion of Iraq, one must then ask whether the Iraq conflict is justified. This question presupposes that war can, in fact, be just and that willingly and knowingly engaging policies that could cause damage to or loss of human life is justifiable. In order to answer that question, one should view the Iraq conflict through the lens of the Just War Theory. The Just War Theory addresses both whether a situation warrants war (jus ad bellum) and whether actions within a war are just (jus in bello). Being of the greatest relevance, the remainder of this discourse will examine the Iraq conflict in light of the jus ad bellum requirements.[9]
The first rule of determining whether a war is just is that of legitimate authority. In order for a nation to declare war on another, only the correct persons of authority may make such a declaration. On October 11, 2002, the United States Congress a resolution allowing then President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to comply with United Nations resolutions, suspend his weapons of mass destruction programs, and immediately disarm.[10] This move by Congress extended the power of the Executive Branch into an area which allowed the President to unilaterally attack Iraq, a decision typically reserved only for Congress. This was intended to provide President Bush with the power necessary to respond to the perceived threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his alleged possession of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. In doing this, President Bush became the person of legitimate authority to make the decision to go to war against Iraq.
The next aspect of the Just War Theory that must be met in order for a war to be considered just is that of just cause. If a nation goes to war and wants that war to be considered acceptable, it must provide just cause for the declaration of war. Within the context of Iraq, the United States had information indicating that Saddam Hussein’s government had weapons of mass destruction and that the possession of these weapons posed a threat to the United States. When looking at the Iraq conflict through the lens of the Just War Theory, it is difficult to rectify the concept of just cause with the information presented as evidence to support the case for war against Iraq.
When he addressed the American people, President Bush stated that the primary reason for invading Iraq was to address concerns about Saddam Hussein threatening the United States or its allies with weapons of mass destruction.4 The support the President received from Congress for military action against Iraq was due in part to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the sentiments shared by many members of Congress about Iraq and Saddam Hussein because of the Gulf War.
Looking at Bush’s choices for the Cabinet, one can see that they had a significant impact on the decision to go to war. In fact, six of his Cabinet members had experience dealing with Iraq, which would have biased their opinion of the situation. These members were Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, and Condoleezza Rice. Though his role was downplayed in the media, Wolfowitz may have been one of the most influential players in the push to attack Iraq. Only days after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Wolfowitz was pushing for the United States to invade Iraq, even before an attack on Afghanistan.[11] Knowing that Congress and many of the President’s closest advisors on the Iraq situation were carrying a grudge from bad experiences under previous administrations and that the evidence supporting an invasion of Iraq was so weak, it is difficult to argue that the United States had just cause for a preemptive attack against Iraq.
The next step in determining whether it is morally permissible to go to war is evaluating the conflict to ensure that war is only a last resort. Nation states have an obligation to attempt to resolve conflict in ways that avoid human suffering and which preserve the sovereignty of the nations with which they are in conflict. In order to accomplish this task, nations should make use of existing structures for conflict resolution such as the United Nations, the use of soft power, negotiations, or arbitration to bring about an acceptable solution where both parties can come to some consensus. This is important because pursuing war inevitably results in loss of human life and frequently damages the quality of life for those impacted by the war.
When making the initial case for military intervention in Iraq, President Bush went to the United Nations General Assembly to open dialogue about the need for immediate UN action to prevent Saddam Hussein from manufacturing or otherwise using biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons against another nation.2 Unfortunately, the UN Security Council members did not agree that the situation in Iraq warranted the use of force and the United States vowed to enter Iraq with a small coalition or alone if the United Nations would not support joint action against Saddam Hussein.
When the UN failed to provide the US with the support it wanted, the Bush administration did not make significant attempts to gain UN support, but instead determined that the diplomatic process had failed and that all options to avoid force had been exhausted. At this point, the US issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein including that Iraq immediately cease the production of weapons of mass destruction and that Hussein resign as acting leader of the nation. Hussein did not comply with the ultimatum and the US invaded the sovereign nation of Iraq to force them into compliance. In this situation, the Bush administration attempted to paint the image of attempts at diplomacy, but made very little effort to ensure that those attempts would be successful. Though some attempt was made, it was not so great that the US could reasonably contend that they had taken every reasonable effort to avoid war and that the idea of an invasion of Iraq was, in fact, a last resort.
Another important aspect of the Just War Theory is the idea that the decision to go to war must be proportional to the consequences of not going to war. It would be unreasonable for a nation to go to war against another nation to gain access to non-essential resources that could be obtained through non-violent means. Within this context, nations in conflict must be able to use existing conflict resolution tools like the United Nations to help address such conflicts and prevent them from escalating to levels where it becomes more likely that wars could be fought over the resources available.
When applying this idea to the situation between the United States and Iraq, it becomes necessary to understand the extent to which Saddam Hussein actually posed a threat to the United States. Though the Bush administration successfully marketed the idea that Hussein was producing weapons of mass destruction and could be linked to terrorist organizations, the evidence to support these claims simply did not exist. This became problematic when the United States demanded that Iraq stop manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, which were not being produced at all. The United States demanded that they cease production of WMD’s, but they were not currently producing such weapons. In this case, it is apparent that the United States could not justify war against Iraq within the context of proportionality. The very reasons cited for the invasion turned out to be untrue and the damage done to Iraq under the premise of them having WMD’s was far greater than the potential damage that Iraq could really have done, given that they had no WMD’S.
The final component of the Just War Theory that must be considered when deciding whether to go to war is the probability of success. Unlike the other functional requirements that have immediate benefits for the opposing group, this component protects the nation deciding on whether to go to war. This aspect is of particular importance in that a good leader would not want to willingly or knowingly send their troops or citizens into harm’s way unless they stood a fair chance at defending themselves and could, reasonably, prove to be victorious.
When President Bush decided to send American troops to intervene in the conflict with Iraq, his administration had already been planning for months the strategies and techniques to employ to be able to quickly and effectively disable and disarm the Iraqi military, remove Saddam Hussein from power, find the hidden weapons of mass destruction, and begin the process democratization in Iraq. Though the American government may appear to have been short sighted in every other aspect of the Just War Theory, it is unquestionable that the US spent a great deal of time exploring the various attack options against Iraq and how to respond to various types of attacks by the Iraqi military including biological or chemical attacks. Furthermore, the enormous US defense budget makes it abundantly clear that most other nations are no match for the strength of its military. In this situation, the Bush administration had sufficient reason to believe that the probability of success in Iraq was high.
Though the Bush administration was able to gain support for action against Iraq within the United States, it was unable to gather international support for the use of force against the totalitarian regime that Saddam Hussein had built. The Bush administration, arguably, failed to meet all the requirements of the Just War Theory, which would imply that the Iraq war is, in fact, unjust and that we have no right to be there. In spite of what may have been good intentions, the United States lacked just cause, which is paramount in determining whether the use of force against another nation is just. In the case of Iraq, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that the United States faced an imminent threat unless the Iraqi government was overthrown and a democracy implemented in the place of Hussein’s totalitarian regime.
The Iraq case is especially interesting in the study of international war and conflict because it provides a modern example of how unchecked power can quickly escalate to poor decisions that are based on biased opinions, experiences, and incorrect information. This situation helps draw attention to the increasing need in the global community for leaders who value the democratic process, who believe in and practice conflict transformation or resolution, and who are able to see that the institutions and structures we have established to deal with conflict work best when they are allowed time to accomplish their purpose.
[1] Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis, “Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, no. 4 (Winter, 2003/2004), pg 569, The Academy of Political Science. 28 October 2009 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30035697>.
[2] Marc Lynch, “Using and Abusing the UN, Redux,” Middle East Report, No. 225, (Winter, 2002), pg 8, Middle East Research and Information Project. 28 October 2009 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559345>.
3 United States. National Security Council. “V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (September 2002), page 15. 10 November 2009 <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>.
[4] Bush, George. "President Bush Addresses the Nation". (13 March 2003), The White House. 11 November 2009 <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html>.
[5] "Charter of the United Nations.” Article 51, Section 1. (26 June 1945), United Nations. 11 November 2009 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.
[6] Taft IV, William H and Todd F. Buchwald. “Preemption, Iraq, and International law,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3 (July 2003), pg 557. American Society of International Law. 10 November 2009 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3109840>.
[7] "Charter of the United Nations.” Article 2, Section 4. (26 June 1945), United Nations. 11 November 2009 <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.
[8] Dunn, David Hastings. “Myths, Motivations, and ‘Misunderestimations’: The Bush Administration and Iraq,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 - ), Vol. 79, No. 2 (March 2003). Page 281. Blackwell Publishing. 10 November 2009 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3095821>.
[9]Kinsella, David, and Craid L. Carr. The Morality of War: A Reader. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2007, pp 55-58.
[10] “Senate approves Iraq war resolution.” (11 October 2002). CNN. 10 November 2009 <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/11/iraq.us/>
[11] “Paths to Power.” (26 October 2004). PBS. 08 November 2009. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/paths/bush2.html>.
Iraq: An Unjust War by Paul Pennell is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 United States License.
Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available at http://sites.google.com/site/popennell/copyrightpermissions.